Statman's 1-Section Theorem [17] is an important but little-known result in the model theory of the simplytyped λ-calculus. The λ-Section Theorem states a necessary and sufficient condition on models of the simply-typed λ-calculus for determining whether βη-equational reasoning is complete for proving equations that hold in a model. We review the statement of the theorem, give a detailed proof, and discuss its significance.
Introduction
The theory of the simply-typed A-calculus forms the foundation of call-by-name functional languages. The simply-typed A-calculus comes equipped with an equational theory-the (P) and (q) axioms together with the usual rules of equality-and a n independently-characterizable class of models. The equations (P) and ( 7 ) are sound for proving facts in models, viz., an equation derivable from the axioms is valid in all models. A more general fact encompassing soundness is completeness: an equation between simply-typed A-terms is provable via Pq-reasoning iff the equation holds in all models. An arbitrary model of the simply-typed A-calculus may, of course, satisfy more equations than those provable from (0) and (7) . Here we shall discuss a simple necessary and sufficient criterion for determining whether the equational theory of a single model, or more generally a class of models, is captured completely by Pq-equality. The criterion, due t o Richard Statman, is crystallized in the 1-Section Theorem. Part of our purpose here will be t o state the theorem and present a rigorous proof: although it is cited in [17] and follows from results in [16] , a complete proof has never appeared in the literature. Statman's criterion may be easily applied t o a host of models, and we will demonstrate its applicability t o show the completeness of ,@reasoning for some of the more familiar models of the simply-typed A-calculus.
It is not hard t o find a model that satisfies exactly the equations provable from ( P ) and (q).
One can construct such a model B out of Pq-equivalence classes of open terms; the (,b) and '(i) axioms are crucial in verifying that B is a model. Note that the non-soundness direction of the completeness theorem above follows as a corollary: if an equation is not provable from ( 0 ) and (q), there is a model, namely B, that denies the equation. But this "term model" has little independent interest beyond proving the completeness theorem. Another model, definable without reference to the (p) and (7) axioms, is the full set-theoretic model S over N, defined
where [ A + B] is the set of all total functions from A to B. From a mathematical point of view, the model S is important precisely because it contains all the higher-order functions one may encounter in mathematical statements and proofs. Of course, not all the functions in S are definable in the simply-typed A-calculus, since the set of simply-typed A-terms is countable and the set of elements in S is uncountable. For those functions that are definable, Pq-equality is complete:
Thus, if we wish to prove a fact about A-definable functions in S , we may substitute pq-reasoning (which is decidable, cf.
[I]) for denotational reasoning. S is but one example of a model for which pq-reasoning is complete; standard denotational models of functional languages provide more examples. In denotational models, we usually use posets instead of sets and continuous functions rather than set-theoretic functions. Continuity allows an easy interpretation of recursion present in most programming languages [5] . The model N built out of all continuous functions over the base Scott domain N I is a familiar example of a denotational model for the language P C F [9, 151. More formally,
where NI is the poset of natural numbers ordered discretely with an element I ordered below every element of N, and [NT +, N " ] is the Scott domain of continuous functions from NT to Nu ordered pointwise [5] . Then Classes of models can also be complete for pq-equational reasoning:
In particular, showing that M = N holds in all models with finite base type can be established by showing that A4 =p, N.
The original proofs of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2, and 1.3 proceed quite differently: the proofs of the first two construct logical relations between the term model and the model in question, while the proof of the third relies on certain combinatorial facts about A-terms. In fact, the combinatorial arguments may be adapted to prove Theorems 1.1 and 1.2. (The logical relation argument has important uses in other contexts, cf. [ l l , 121 .) The combinatorial argument is essentially captured by Statman's 1-Section Theorem, which states that if a certain algebra can be faithfully embedded in the first-order part of a class of models-in a sense to be made more precise in Section 3-then pq-equational reasoning is complete for proving all equations in the class of models. Section 4 describes a detailed proof of the 1-Section Theorem, showing how the combinatorial structure of the required embedded algebra can be used to deduce completeness. The importance of the 1-Section Theorem lies not in its statement but in its applicability. In Section 5, we show how the 1-Section Theorem can be used t o prove Theorems 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. We also show how these, and other similar theorems, can be used in reasoning about functional programming languages. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of some open problems.
Review of the simply-typed A-calculus
We first briefly review the syntax, semantics, and equational theory of the simply-typed A-calculus. The reader familiar with the simply-typed A-calculus may care t o skim this section in order t o understand the notation we use.
Syntax
Each term in the simply-typed A-calculus comes with a simple type. Simple types are defined inductively t o be the base type 1, usually taken to be the type of natural numbers, and (r -t v), the type of functions from T t o v, where r and v themselves are types. For readability, we often drop parentheses from types with the understanding that -t associates t o the right, e.g., (L -t (L -t 1)) is abbreviated (1 + i -+ 1). This convention implies that any simple type a can be written uniquely in the form (al --+ a;? -t . . .a, + L ) for some n 2 0.
The set of simply-typed terms is parameterized by a signature, which is just a set of typed constants. The set of simply-typed terms over the signature C, together with their types, is defined in Table 1 . We adopt many of the standard notational conventions of the A-calculus from [I]. For instance, the usual definitions of free and bound variables are used and F V ( M ) denotes the set of free variables of M. Terms are identified up t o renaming of bound variables, and are denoted by the letters M , N , P, Q , S, and T. Parentheses may be dropped from applications under the assumption that applica.tion a.ssociates t o the left, i.e., (A4 N P) is short for ((A4 N ) P). We will also drop types from variables whenever the types are unimportant or can be deduced from the context, and use the letters u, u, W , x, y, and z t o denote variables. Finally, syntactic substitution is written M [ x := N], where the substitution renames the bound variables of M t o avoid capturing the free variables of N .
S e m a n t i c s via e n v i r o n m e n t m o d e l s
Although there are other equivalent definitions of models, here we assign meaning to terms using environment models [4, 6, 71 . Environment models have two components, the first of which is a type frame: Intuitively, ApTlU is an abstract "application" function for applying elements in the set MTdU t o elements in the set Mr. The extensionality property states that the set M7"' can be regarded as a set of total functions from MT t o M u ; the most familiar type frames are constructed out of total functions.
The second component of an environment model is a meaning function MI.] that assigns elements of a type frame t o terms. Since there is no way to assign a meaning to an open term a priori, an e n v i r o n m e n t is used t o assign meaning to free variables. Definition 2.2 Let M be a type frame. An M -e n v i r o n m e n t p is a map from variables to elements of M that respects types, i.e., p(xa) E Ma. Not every type frame is an environment model, since the definition requires the existence of an appropriate meaning for each A-abstraction. Some standard examples of environment models were given in the introduction. Another example is the type frame consisting of all set-theoretic functions over a base set X, defined by X"
There are other ways of defining environment models other than by explicit constructions. For example, we may construct a direct product out of a class of models. We could, of course, generalize the definition to uncountable direct products, but we will only need countable direct products here. It is important to note that this construction always yields a model. 
Proof: First we need to verify that M is indeed a type frame, and so we need t o show that application in the structure is extensional. To that end, consider any f = ( fo, fl, f2,. . .) and g = (g0,g1,g2, ...) in the set MT'". If f = g, then it is easy to see that Ap(f,d) = Ap(g,d)
for any d E M r . If f # g, then for some i, fi # g;. Since Mi is a type frame, there exists an element d; E MI such that Api( f;, d;) # Api(gi, d;). For all j # i, pick any dj E M 3 , and let
Therefore, M obeys the extensionality property.
To see that M is a model, define where p;(x) = d; if p(x) = (do,dl,d2,. . .). We claim that this matches the inductive definition of the meaning function in Definition 2.2; the proof is a straightforward induction on terms. Finally, we must show that M + M = N iff for all i, Mi 'F M = N , which follows easily from the definition of b..
P q -e q u a t i o n a l t h e o r y
Reasoning about equalities of A-terms can also be done purely syntactically. The equational theory of the simply-typed A-calculus appears in Table 2 . All equational theories include the axiom ( r e n and the rules (symm), which axiomatize = as an equivalence relation; the rules (cong) and (t) similarly allow substitution of equals for equals. The only other axioms of the theory are ( P ) and (q), which can be justified by examining the intended class of models defined above. We write M =p, N when M and N are provably equivalent using the axioms and rules of Table 2 .
The equational axioms of (P) and (7) may be directed into a rewrite system. 
The proposition follows easily from the Church-Rosser Theorem for the simply-typed A-calculus [I, 7, 181. For the proofs in this paper, we will use e where k, n 3 0, u is either a variable or constant, and each Mi is in extended 07-normal form.
Extended 07-normal forms are called @-normal forms in [16] . Closed extended 07-normal forms are easier t o induct upon than &-normal forms, because the constituent terms M I , . . . , M k are also closed extended 07-normal forms. It is also appropriate to call these terms "normal forms" due to the following proposition: We are now ready to give the statement of the 1-Section Theorem. Let 7 be the free closed term algebra on a single binary constant F and a single nullary constant C. In computer science terminology, the carrier set of 7 can be described by the context-free grammar
where 7 + To = Tl iff To and Tl are syntactically equivalent. The name 7 stands for "tree algebra", since the elements in the algebra denote binary trees.
S t a t m a n ' s 1-Section T h e o r e m 3.2 Let C be a class of models over the empty signature. Then ,@-equality completely axiomatizes the valid equations of C i f S 7 can be faithfully embedded i n some countable direct product of models i n C .
The name of the 1-Section Theorem comes from the fact that an algebra is embeddable in the first-order part-the 1-section-of a model.
Proof of the Theorem
One direction of the l-Section Theorem follows fairly straightforwardly from the fact that there are only a countable number of equations at any given type. In order to complete the proof of the l-Section Theorem, we are left with proving Lemma 4.1.
In outline, we first prove a restricted version of Lemma 4.1, where the terms M and N to be distinguished only take arguments of first-order type, i.e., those with type (1 --t . . . --t L). We then show, for the more general case when M and N's arguments are not of first-order type, how to reduce the problem to terms that take arguments of only first-order type. In proving the two lemmas, we will always assume that the terms are in extended Pq-normal form, which we may assume without loss of generality by Proposition 2.8.
We begin by establishing the first claim. In the induction case, there are three cases (up to symmetry) depending on the form of M and N :
1. For some k 2 1, 2. For some k , l 2 1 and i # j,
For some k 2 1
The first two cases can be argued similarly to the basis; the only difficult case is the third case. By our hypothesis on the types of the terms M and N , the variable xQ' has a first-order type. Thus, ( M j 2 1 . . . x,) must have type L and hence M j has type o. Likewise, N j has type a. Thus, since M j # N j , it follows from the induction hypothesis that ( L M j ) #p, ( L N j ) . Performing some calculation,
It therefore follows that ( M j PI . . . P,) #p, ( N j PI . . . P,). Thus, since
AS. Ax. 9 i (9 ( M l F ) (9 ( M2 F) (. -. ( 9 (Mk-1 F ) (Mk F ) ) . . .))) ( L N ) =p, Xg. AX. N P I . . . P, =p, X9-Ax. 9 i (9 (N1 P ) (9 ( N2 P ) (. . . P ) (Nk P)) . . .))) it must be the case that ( L M ) #p, ( L N ) . This completes the induction case and hence the proof of the lemma. W Now our goal is to reduce the original problem to the statement of Lemma 4.2. Let X be the set of first-order variables and let AX be the set of simply-typed A-terms which contain no constants and whose only free variables are in X. The second lemma for proving Lemma 4.1 states that we may apply M and N to terms in this set to arrive at inequivalent terms: In the induction case, there are a number of cases depending on the form of M and N. The only difficult case is when for some k > 1, for which we will need the induction hypothesis. Since M # N , it must be the case that M j # Nj for some 1 < j 5 k. By induction, there exist terms Ul,. . . , U,, . . . ,Urn such that (Mi Ul . . . Urn) #p, (Nj Ul . . .Urn), and both (Mi Ul . . .Urn) and ( N j Ul . ..Urn) are of type L . Choose fresh variables h 6 + L + A and yl,. . . , yk, i.e., variables not appearing free in any of the terms U1,. . . ,Urn. For any 1 5 p 5 n, define Ayl. . . . Ayk. h (yj Un+l . . . Urn) (Ui yl . . . yk) if p = i otherwise The reader should convince himself that V , has the appropriate type.
We just need to verify that ( M Vl . . . V,) #p, ( N Vl . . . V,). First, we do a little calculation: ( 1 . . . . V,) . This completes the induction case and hence the proof. . This completes the proof of the 1-Section Theorem.
Corollaries of the 1-Section Theorem
The significance of the 1-Section Theorem lies in its corollaries. Here we give some examples of models that satisfy the criterion of the 1-Section Theorem, and then briefly discuss applications of the theorem in the context of simply-typed call-by-name functional languages.
Models
In most familiar models of the simply-typed A-calculus, it is easy to check that Statman's 1-Section condition holds. For instance, recall the set-theoretic model S defined in the introduction: The proof of Theorem 1.1 is much easier than the proof contained in [4] , and may be easily adapted to other situations as well. For instance, we may easily prove the following theorem: . .). Thus, by the 1-Section Theorem, ,@reasoning is complete for 3.
Implications for Programming Languages
The 1-Section Theorem may also be applied to reasoning about programming languages based on the simply-typed A-calculus. Here we give some brief examples that show that pr/-equality is complete for reasoning about fragments of certain call-by-name languages.
One example of a language based on the simply-typed A-calculus is the language P C F [15, 93. P C F without booleans includes constants for numerals, successor, predecessor, conditional, and fixpoint operators for recursion, where the conditional operator checks its first argument to see if it is 0 and branches. A precise definition of the language and its interpreter may be found in [12] ; importantly, applications are evaluated call-by-name.
To the programmer, two pieces of P C F code are "equivalent" if they can be used interchangeably. For closed terms of base type in PCF, two terms are interchangeable iff both diverge or both produce the same numeral when evaluated. This notion of equality tells us nothing about open terms or terms of higher-type, but we may extend the equality to general terms in the following natural manner: For instance, the two P C F terms (Ax. pred (succ x)) and (Ax. x) are observationally congruent, since both are, in some sense, the identity function on the integers. P C F observational congruence is too complex to be axiomatized by any reasonable system. All partial recursive functions are representable in P C F in such a way that two partial recursive functions are equivalent iff their representations are equivalent. Thus, since equivalence of partial recursive functions cannot be axiomatized in an r.e. proof system, neither can observational congruence [15, 201 . But if we are willing to settle for proving observational congruences among p u r e terms-those not involving the constants of PCF-we can obtain a complete proof system. The following remark is due to Albert Meyer:
T h e o r e m 5. 3 For two pure simply-typed terms M and N , M =p, N iff M E P C F N .
The theorem follows from the fact that one can define a strict pairing function p" in P C F by the term (Ax'. AyL. (2"3Y)), where exponentiation and multiplication are defined from successor, predecessor, and recursion in the usual way. (Full recursion is, of course, unnecessary for defining a pairing function, e.g., a representation for addition and multiplication suffices [3].) Thus, the model constructed out of observational congruence classes of terms in P C F (which can be verified to be a model) satisfies the conditions of the 1-Section Theorem, and hence observational congruence and ,@equality of pure terms coincides. Theorem 1.2 also implies a similar fact for reasoning about a parallel version of PCF. Consider the usual P C F language augmented with a "parallel or" constant por of type (L -+ L -+ L); por returns 0 if either of its arguments reduces to 0, 1 if both reduce to numerals not equal to 0, and diverges otherwise. We call the extended language Parallel PCF, or P P C F for short. We may extend the model N of continuous functions defined above to a model N' of P P C F by interpreting the constants in the right way, and in this model, denotational equality coincides with observational congruence [9, 14, Coupled with Theorem 5.3, Theorem 5.5 implies that among pure terms, sequential and parallel observational congruence theories coincide.
The practical implications of Theorems 5.3 and 5.5 should be clear: for reasoning about pure terms, 07-equality proves all operationally valid equations. In more philosophical terms, 07reasoning is the core of any reasoning system for these two languages. One may then extend the reasoning systems to include equations about successors and predecessors, or t o more complex systems involving induction principles for reasoning about recursion. Such systems will necessarily be incomplete, but a t the very least, the core of the reasoning system will be complete.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated the use of Statman's 1-Section Theorem in proving that 07-equality is complete for proving the valid equations in a model. Essentially, Statman's 1-Section Theorem isolates a single combinatorial argument for proving the completeness of 07-reasoning in a model of the simply-typed A-calculus. The combinatorial fact needed, that a binary tree algebra can be faithfully embedded in the particular model, is quite easy t o check, and thus Statman's 1-Section Theorem simplifies the proofs of many completeness results.
The power of Statman's 1-Section Theorem is unquestionable, but one may well wonder whether a simpler version of the theorem is possible. For instance, the tree algebra might be unnecessary in the statement of the theorem; the unary algebra U, whose elements are in the grammar and U1 =u U2 iff U1 and U2 are syntactically equivalent, may suffice. In other words, we could imagine that it is sufficient t o embed the algebra U in a model in order for 07-reasoning t o be complete. This conjecture, however, is false: Theorem 6.1 (Subrahmanyam) There is a model M i n which the algebra U can be faithfully embedded but whose valid equations are not coinpletely axiomatized by =p,.
Proof: Consider the model M over the signature F"'", C q u i l t in the following manner: where the number of leading F's is > 0. Now consider the terms where f has type ( L i L i L ) and x , y have type L. A simple case analysis shows that P and Q are equivalent in the model. Nevertheless, P #p, Q. H Other extensions to the 1-Section Theorem look much more promising. For example, we may consider adding first-order algebraic theories t o the simply-typed A-calculus, and ask when (P), ( r l ) , and the equations of the algebraic theory completely axiomatize the valid equations of the model.
For instance, we could axiomatize the equations of the algebra (Pd, 0, +) by Preliminary results with Ramesh Subrahmanyam [13] give a version of the 1-Section Theorem for algebraic theories. Extensions t o when simply-typed A-calculus has a lazy or call-by-value selnantics are also being investigated.
